


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PSYCHOLOGICAL
STRATEGICAL
BOARD



November 2, 1951

GENERAL SMITH:

The attached copy of my letter to Mr. Lay, together with suggested paragraphs prepared by the PSB Staff for consideration for inclusion in the new 114 Series draft paper, are being furnished to the Members of the Board and the Alternates for information.


Gordon Gray
Director

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November 2, 1951

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Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington, D.C.


Dear Jimmy:

General Cutler tells me that groups are now at work, in accordance with NSC Action Number 575g, preparing for submission to the NSC Senior Staff a draft "reappraisal of the policies and programs set forth in the NSC 68 and 114 Series, including a revision of Part I of NSC 114/2."

In line with his talk with you last week our Staff has prepared some paragraphs dealing with "Psychological Strategy in the Ensuing Years." I enclose a draft of these paragraphs for consideration for inclusion in this draft reappraisal.

Copies are being furnished to the Members of the Board and the Alternates for their information.

Sincerely,



Gordon Gray
Director

Secret Attachment
cc: General Smith ✓
Mr. Webb
Mr. Foster
Mr. Barrett
General Magruder
Mr. Dulles

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY IN THE ENSUING YEARS

(for suggested inclusion in further development of NSC 114/2)

1. Earlier sections of this report have contrasted the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and its satellites with those of the United States and the other peoples not under Kremlin domination. If military capability were the sole measure, the likelihood of the free world attaining its objectives would appear bleak indeed. This sense of pessimism is increased when one compares the weaknesses inherent in democracies acting together as allies with the apparent strength of an enforced combination of states under a dictator.

2. But there are other factors which, on a proper assessment and with a vigorous development, can change the picture of the future from one of fatalistic pessimism to one of positive optimism that our objectives can be reached without a general war. These factors are the psychological vulnerabilities of the Kremlin and the moral assets of the free world.

3. The most important of these vulnerabilities and assets are the intangible defects and strengths which have historically spelled the defeat of tyranny and the victory of freedom. They take deep root in the spirit of man.

(a) The exploitable vulnerabilities of the Kremlin regime have been appraised in earlier sections of this report. There are the visible cracks in the Monolith: such as, - peasant unrest, slave labor camps, inferior economy, inadequate transport facilities, unhappily subjugated

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peoples of the satellites, etc. Equally important, though less discernible, are the weaknesses which lie hidden beneath despotic power. A particular vulnerability must be considered in appraising the warlike intentions of the rulers of the Kremlin: - their distrust of the peoples under their subjugation. The Kremlin must never be allowed to forget that if it should choose to launch a general war against the free world, it would be tearing down the Iron Curtain behind the shelter of which it has so ruthlessly regulated the minds and wills of the masses. These seen and unseen vulnerabilities are avenues of attack and exploitation open to us in time of cold war.

(b) On the other hand, the moral assets of the United States and her allies extend far beyond a superior industrial potential and the predominant skills of management and labor in the free world. There is, especially, the fact of freedom. That fact is the basic ingredient of our strength and is lacking in peoples compelled to support tyranny.

4. In recent years, we have seen striking instances of the will to be free asserting itself, in the very face of the Kremlin's predominant armed manpower: - the Marshall Plan, the aid to Greece and Turkey, the Berlin Airlift, the defense of Korea, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the San Francisco Peace Conference. By these positive actions the free world has on occasion, in economic, military, and political terms, taken the initiative away from the Kremlin. But these separate actions, each so striking and valuable in itself, have not brought with them to our side the maximum psychological advantage which should derive from a planned cold war strategy.

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5. To the contrary, even among our staunch friends in Europe doubts have arisen as to the intentions of the United States. Twice in time of general war the United States has created an overpowering military might. If at a time when no general war exists the United States starts to rebuild the martial power of itself and its friends, can that power when full-grown be held to defensive measures? The Kremlin supplies to world opinion a sinister - and false - reply: the free governments are imperialist aggressors and war-mongers and the Soviet Union is the only true friend of peace. The nationalist hunger of the peoples in the Near, Middle, and Far East feeds on these lies. And to workers everywhere the Soviets hold out the vision of a material paradise under Communist rule, - in the future. The whole picture so presented is false, and it is up to us to show the truth.

6. We must find the way to arouse throughout the world an enthusiasm for a common cause, the cause of a free world at peace in which an economy of plenty can flourish. We must bring home to all peoples how much this common cause, to which we are dedicated, needs their help. It is far less important to tell them of the extent to which the United States can and will help them. The significant point is to make them identify the future they want with the future we want. This task calls for positive action in the field of psychological strategy; action in the next few years, before the Kremlin through miscalculation or alarm provokes a general conflict or before our military expenditures place so heavy and long a strain upon our economy that the Soviets might insidiously prevail without resort to general war.

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7. It is not here suggested that action should now be taken which would deliberately provoke the Kremlin to general war or risk the open rebellion of our friends in Communist-dominated territory without some adequate means to support and exploit that rebellion. What is here suggested is that the United States government vigorously develop and employ a psychological strategy designed to exploit the initiative in the cold war where already possessed and to seize it in other areas.

8. Our government should make its policy decisions and plan its substantial actions in the political, economic, and military fields so as to integrate the full potential of our national power and so as to derive therefrom most telling impact upon the minds and wills of foreign governments and peoples. Such a course of positive psychological strategy would do more than enable us to gain time for ourselves and our friends to establish an adequate military posture. It would also, without resort to war, contribute directly to our objectives of freeing the peoples in Soviet-dominated areas from the grip of the Kremlin regime and of so fostering the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system itself that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

9. The following courses of action suggest themselves:

a. We shall seek to convince all peoples of the world — great and small — that we are dedicated to maintaining, without resort to general war, a world at peace and in that world an economy of plenty; and that there is need for each of them in the common struggle for this goal.

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b. We shall seek affirmative ways by which to deter the Soviet Union from undertaking a global war and to deny to the Soviet Union the capability of achieving its aims by measures short of war. Thus, we shall operate against the vulnerabilities of the existing Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and in areas now under its control, and seek to create conditions under which these areas may be freed from the Kremlin's grip.

c. We shall reduce Communist strength in the free world and build up the will of the free world to resist both Communist influence and Communist aggression.

d. We shall undertake these courses of action as integral parts of an over-all strategy.

(End)

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10 July 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tracy Barnes
Deputy Director
Psychological Strategy Board
708 Jackson Place, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

FROM: Allen W. Dulles

The following quotation was contained in a report delivered by Stalin at a Plenary Session of the Central Committee and Control Commission of the Communist Party of the USSR on January 7, 1933, in giving the results of the First Five Year Plan: "They (these have-beens) are organizing wrecking activities in the collective farms and state farms, and some of them, including certain professors, got to such lengths as to inject the germs of plague and anthrax into the cattle on the collective and the state farms, help spread meningitis among horses, etc." It is interesting that in attacking the agricultural experts who were criticizing collectivization, Stalin used the same germ warfare propaganda which he is now using against us in Korea. It seems to me this might be useful for propaganda purposes and we are considering here how to use it through channels available to us.

AWD:at

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